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“Those who don’t know history are destined 
to repeat it.”
                 (Edmund Burke)
It has become increasingly, and sometimes 
frustratingly, clear that in the past few years 
some researchers working with non-human 
animals either have forgotten (or were never 
taught) the perils of inadvertent cuing. I 
wrote this article after completing another 
journal review in which the methodology 
involved an experimenter presenting two 
or more choices to an animal. The experi-
menter prepared the trial, presented it, 
watched the animal as it made its response, 
and then recorded that response. In this 
case, as in some others in our field, the test 
itself was creative, unique, and exciting, and 
the performance by the animals tested was 
adequate to suggest they might be doing 
something interesting and perhaps reflective 
of cognitive processing. But, the possibility 
that cuing might have occurred dampened 
my enthusiasm for the project, and damp-
ened my spirits about the state and future 
of the field in general because too many 
papers get through the peer review process 
without having proper controls for cuing. 
In the interests of full disclosure, I cannot 
say I have always been perfect in preventing 
any chance of cuing in the tests I have done 
with animals, but I do worry that more and 
more often there is not even the recognition 
of the need to control for possible cuing in 
experiments assessing animal cognition.
When I started graduate school, the first 
project I worked on involved computerized 
testing of chimpanzees that were learning 
to match Arabic numerals to dots on the 
screen. They saw a numeral, and had to col-
lect dots, one-at-a-time, until they indicated 
they thought they had the right number. If 
they were right, the computer played a tone, 
and if wrong, it played a buzz. My job was to 
give them a treat when they were right, and 
of course to also try to keep them engaged 
in the task in general. The first thing I was 
told, though, was “never look at the com-
puter screen while they are working. If you 
do not know how they are doing until the 
computer tells you, you cannot cue them 
while they are working.”
Hence the problem when the experi-
menter watches the response. He or she 
knows the correct response, and almost 
certainly hopes the animal will make that 
response (otherwise, no publication, no 
degree, no grant, no tenure, etc.). In this 
case, experimenter expectation rears its ugly 
head, and cannot be controlled. It is not my 
intention in this article to “call out” any par-
ticular researcher or team of researchers, but 
it is critical to get the attention of those who 
are failing to design adequate methods for 
controlling inadvertent cuing. Some of these 
groups make (or, at least, report) almost no 
attempt to control for cuing, whereas others 
do implement some design aspects to address 
cuing, but not enough. Sometimes, one reads 
in manuscripts or in published articles some-
thing like “the experimenter looked straight 
ahead, did not look at the animal, did not 
respond to the animal, or otherwise did not 
give any feedback to the animal during its 
response.” Plain and simple, this is not pos-
sible to conclude. This was exactly the lesson 
of the horse named Clever Hans, a lesson that 
is now more than 100 years old, but also one 
that seems to be increasingly forgotten.
Clever Hans was, indeed, an incredibly 
clever animal. The problem was that he was 
clever in ways not related to the apparent 
intellect that first drew attention to him. 
Initially, it was believed that Hans was capa-
ble of all kinds of mathematical and com-
putational feats (pun intended, given that 
Hans responded to questions by tapping his 
hoof). He consistently provided the correct 
answer to all manner of questions. And, 
initially, some of the foremost experts on 
animal behavior validated his performance 
as reflecting true cognitive skill. However, 
this was not true. Instead, the cleverness of 
Hans was reflected in his acute sensitivity to 
subtle cues given by those who asked him 
questions. The mystery was solved when it 
became clear that Hans only answered ques-
tions correctly when the people asking the 
question and watching his answer also knew 
the answer themselves (Pfungst, 1911). Hans 
was using tension, concentration, relaxation, 
some changes in posture, and other similar 
kinds of bodily cues that people exhibited as 
he was responding. Thus became the criti-
cal lesson of Clever Hans – if you know the 
answer, you should not ask the question and 
score the response given by the participant. 
If you do, the possibility for cuing exists, and 
the potential for erroneous interpretations 
of the responses of subjects also exists.
This concern about cuing, in fact, par-
tially inspired the development of the one 
of the most important, and longest lasting, 
apparatus used in comparative psychology – 
Harlow’s Wisconsin General Test Apparatus 
(WGTA; Harlow and Bromer, 1938; Harlow, 
1949). One point of the WGTA (and of even 
earlier apparatus that were precursors to the 
WGTA) was to make sure that the animal 
could not see the experimenter at all dur-
ing the set-up of trials and during its own 
response. Instead, the experimenter viewed 
the animal in a one-directional manner, pre-
venting any possible cues from occurring. 
Subsequent use of versions of the WGTA 
occurred in many animal laboratories, and 
the development of computerized testing 
with non-human primates (e.g., Rumbaugh 
et al., 1989) and then other species also was 
at least partly due to the desire to eliminate 
the potential for cuing of subjects. And, 
of course, test boxes of other kinds (e.g., 
Skinner boxes) used with pigeons, rats, 
and other animals eliminated this concern 
as well.
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Note that this is not a concern only for 
animal researchers. It is a possibility with 
any test subject. All too often in develop-
mental studies, for example, researchers 
act as if such cues are not possible with 
human children (or, for that matter, with 
adult human participants). And, in com-
parative psychology, especially in tests of 
comparative cognition, the methods are 
often adopted and adapted from develop-
mental psychology. Hence, the problem 
compounds. Even worse is when research 
teams, when asked why they do not have 
adequate controls, respond by saying “this 
is how it is done with children, or by group 
X who did it before us with species Y.” This 
is an entirely inadequate and misguided jus-
tification. My contention is that any study 
that fails to control for cuing is flawed, and it 
should not be replicated, at least with regard 
to the methodological details that allowed 
for the potential cuing to occur.
One might ask whether the problem 
is really that worrisome, and the answer 
is a resounding yes. First, many empirical 
comparative studies looking at cognitive 
processes involve only a small number of 
subjects, and these studies are rarely rep-
licated by other laboratories or with other 
subjects (see Agrillo and Miletto Petrazzini, 
2012). So, the first report is often the only 
one, and a positive report of some new 
behavioral phenomenon is likely to be 
highly cited, and highly influential on the-
ory and subsequent work in that topic area. 
But if the possibility of cuing exists, we are 
then stuck with equivocal data, and perhaps 
erroneous conclusions.
The problem of cuing can be even 
worse when the phenomenon of interest 
might have practical, real-world implica-
tions. One of the best examples of this 
comes from a recent paper by Lit et al. 
(2011). They tested whether the beliefs of 
human handlers could impact the behav-
ior of scent dogs – dogs trained to provide 
critical services by finding drugs or explo-
sives. When human handlers thought 
(incorrectly) that a site was baited with a 
relevant scent, they reported that the dogs 
more often alerted at those locations. In 
other words, Lit and colleagues showed 
that the handlers’ beliefs affected what 
the dogs did.
The solution is simple: remember Clever 
Hans! Teach students his story, and engrain 
in them the need to, at minimum, run con-
trol trials/sessions in which possible cuing 
is prevented, so that they can see whether 
responding remains the same as when such 
controls are not present. Even better, elimi-
nate possible cuing totally, through the use 
of multiple experimenters who either see 
what the animal does (but do not know 
what it should do) or who prepare trials but 
then do not see what response the animal 
makes. This will let us increase our confi-
dence that the animal sitting across from us 
is responding on the basis of its own learn-
ing, or its own “thinking,” rather than on 
the basis of adjusting its responses based 
on how we are reacting to what it is doing. 
By doing this, we will put the Clever Hans 
Effect back in the barn, and out of view, 
while keeping Clever Hans the reminder in 
full view.
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